
**APPELLATE COURT
OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT**

A.C. 31142

EDWARD A. PERUTA

v.

CONNECTICUT STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL.

**BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
WITH APPENDIX**

*FOR THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
EDWARD A. PERUTA:*

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STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

- I. Does the United States Supreme Court case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010), compel a judicial determination on constitutional grounds of the Action for Declaratory Judgment dismissed below for lack of on subject matter jurisdiction?
Br., Section 1(A)-(D) at 5-18
- II. Did the trial court err by dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a finding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking a Declaratory Judgment from the court?
Br., Section Section II(A)(B) and (D) at 18-24, 32-34
- III. Does the futility exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies apply so that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Action for Declaratory Judgment?
Br., Section II(C), at 24-32.